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Understanding if and how mutants reach fixation in populations is an important question in
evolutionary biology. We study the impact of population growth has on the success of mutants.
To systematically understand the effects of growth we decouple competition from reproduction;
competition follows a birth–death process and is governed by an evolutionary game, while growth
is determined by an externally controlled branching rate. In stochastic simulations we find non-
monotonic behaviour of the fixation probability of mutants as the speed of growth is varied; the
right amount of growth can lead to a higher success rate. These results are observed in both
coordination and coexistence game scenarios, and we find that the ‘one-third law’ for coordination
games can break down in the presence of growth. We also propose a simplified description in terms
of stochastic differential equations to approximate the individual-based model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When and how mutants spread in wildtype popula-
tions is an important question in population dynam-
ics; answering it has implications in bacterial evo-
lution, cancer initiation, viral dynamics and for the
understanding of social phenomena [1–4]. While the
behaviour of populations has traditionally been de-
scribed mostly with deterministic models [5, 6], it
is increasingly recognised that the fate of invading
mutants can be influenced by random genetic drift.
Work from recent decades reflects this shift in mod-
elling, and much current research is concerned with
the properties of stochastic evolution in finite popu-
lations [2, 7–11].
Mathematical models of stochastic evolution typi-
cally describe a population of individuals who can
each be of one of several types or species. In the
simplest scenario one considers the spread of mutant
individuals in a wildtype population. Often the inter-
actions between species follow a birth–death process;
individuals of one type may generate offspring at the
expense of other individuals who are removed from
the population, such that the total population size
is conserved. These events occur stochastically and
their rates are determined by the relative reproduc-
tive fitnesses of the different species; these fitnesses
in turn depend on the composition of the population
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[2, 7]. Evolutionary game theory is a commonly-used
framework for describing these frequency-dependent
dynamics. Fixation probabilities and mean fixation
times can be computed for these stylised models us-
ing techniques from the theory of stochastic processes
[8, 12–15].
More recently, work has also focused on models with
populations of dynamic size. Melbinger et al. have
investigated the impact that demography has on the
spread of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game
[16–18]. Other evolutionary game formats have also
been studied in populations of time-dependent size
[19–23]. In these models growth is limited by an over-
all carrying capacity. The effect of population growth
has also been considered in host–parasite interactions
[24], and in spin systems [25]. Other work specifically
focuses on range expansions in space [26].
In such models that combine selection and growth,
an interesting interplay between the underlying de-
terministic dynamics and intrinsic noise is to be ex-
pected. For example, consider a scenario where the
deterministic flow has a stable fixed point for non-zero
numbers of both types of individual. For infinite pop-
ulations noise can be neglected, and the deterministic
flow leads to the indefinite coexistence of two species.
In finite populations, however, extinction of one of
the two types can and will occur as these phenomena
are driven by the intrinsic noise. A growing popula-
tion presents an interesting intermediate case; if its
initial size is small, demographic stochasticity shapes
the outcome in the early phases (in populations of size
N , intrinsic noise has an amplitude of order N−1/2
relative to deterministic selection). As the popula-
tion grows the relative strength of the noise gradu-
ally reduces, and in the latter stages deterministic
flow dominates over random drift. This can lead to
outcomes of fixation or extinction, or indefinite coex-
istence, as highlighted in Fig. 1. The speed of growth
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2FIG. 1. Stochastic trajectories of a single mutant in a
growing population subject to coexistence-game dynam-
ics. Trajectory colours indicate the outcome of extinction,
fixation, or indefinite coexistence. Background arrows are
the deterministic flow field, as described in section III.
Data shown is for selection strength β = 0.1, payoff ma-
trix (15) with fixed point x? = 0.8, initial population size
N0 = 100, and power-law population growth with expo-
nent γ = 0.4.
determines how long intrinsic noise is relevant before
the deterministic flow takes over. The purpose of our
work is to investigate this in more detail and to char-
acterise the outcome of evolution for different speeds
of population growth.
To address this issue we explicitly decouple the
between-species interactions – birth–death dynamics
in the form of a two-player two-strategy evolution-
ary game – from the reproduction dynamics leading
to population growth. We consider evolutionary sce-
narios described by the well-known cases of the domi-
nance, coordination, and coexistence games [7], as de-
scribed in Sec. II A. Growth in our model is governed
by an externally-controlled per-capita reproduction
rate, Γ(N, t), which may depend on the current pop-
ulation size and/or have an explicit time dependence
as described in Sec. II B. This rate is not frequency-
dependent, such that the growth process itself does
not favour any of the two species – selection is con-
trolled only by the between-species interactions. By
varying the growth law independently from the selec-
tion dynamics, we can systematically test the effect
of population growth on the evolutionary outcome.
This is much harder to do in models in which growth
and selection are combined, as the growth law then
‘emerges’ from the population itself and cannot easily
be controlled externally.
II. MODEL DEFINITIONS
We consider a well-mixed, growing population of dis-
crete individuals. Each member of the population
can be one of two types, A or B. We will refer to
species A as the ‘mutant’ type, and B as the ‘wild-
type’. The state of the population at any time can
be described by the pair of variables (i,N). In our
notation i(t) is the number of individuals of type A
(mutants), and N(t) is the total number of individu-
als in the population at a given time t. The number
of individuals of type B (wildtypes) can be written as
j(t) = N(t)− i(t). Generally we are interested in the
fate of a single mutant in a population of wildtype
individuals. For the dynamics we consider two types
of discrete events: Competition between the species,
and growth of the population.
A. Competition
Competition (or selection) in our model is governed
by transitions of the type (i,N)→ (i± 1, N), i.e. re-
placement of an individual by another of the opposite
type without increasing the population size through
a birth–death process. We use the framework of evo-
lutionary game theory to describe these interactions
[2, 7]. When two individuals interact, the likelihood
for one type to succeed over the other is characterised
by the individuals’ expected payoffs within the pop-
ulation. These are written as piA(i,N) and piB(i,N)
respectively for members of the two types; their pre-
cise form will be defined below. In our model the rates
at which these selection events happen are given by
(i,N)→ (i+ 1, N) : T+i,N =
i(N − i)
N
g(piA, piB)
(i,N)→ (i− 1, N) : T−i,N =
i(N − i)
N
g(piB , piA).
(1)
This follows the lines, for example, of [7, 11]. The
detailed mechanics of these birth–death events are
governed by the competition kernel g(·, ·). Generally,
this kernel will be an increasing function of the first
argument, and decreasing in the second. For our in-
vestigation we use the common choice
g(piA, piB) =
1
1 + exp[−β(piA − piB)] , (2)
which is sometimes referred to as the ‘Fermi process’
[7, 11, 14]. The parameter β ≥ 0 is the intensity of
selection: For β = 0 evolution is neutral with no se-
lection bias in favour of either species, for non-zero
values of β the payoffs determine the direction of se-
lection.
We focus on the case of frequency-dependent selec-
tion; the expected payoffs of the two species depend
3on the current composition of the population. As is
often done in the existing literature (see e.g. [2]) we
assume that piA(i,N) and piB(i,N) are determined
by the following payoff matrix and functions:
A B
A a b
B c d
,
piA(i,N) =
i− 1
N − 1a+
N − i
N − 1b,
piB(i,N) =
i
N − 1c+
N − i− 1
N − 1 d.
(3)
The parameter a describes the payoff an individual
of type A receives from an interaction with another
individual of type A. Parameter b is the payoff to A
when interacting with an individual of type B. Pa-
rameters c and d follow similarly.
For these interactions alone (i.e. without changes
in population size), the deterministic dynamics can
be described by the so-called replicator equation [5].
Writing x(t) = 〈i(t)/N(t)〉 = 〈i(t)〉 /N , where 〈·〉 rep-
resents an average over infinitely many realisations
of the stochastic process, and assuming that higher-
order moments factorise (e.g.
〈
i2
〉
= 〈i〉2), we have
x˙ = x(1− x) [g(piA, piB)− g(piB , piA)] . (4)
Here g(piA, piB) [g(piB , piA)] is the (effective) fitness
of type A [B], where piA(x) = xa + (1 − x)b and
piB(x) = xc+ (1− x)d. The choice of the payoff ma-
trix elements a, b, c, and d determines the shape of
the selection bias. Our analysis below focuses on sev-
eral types of games, representing the different struc-
tures that can arise. These include cases in which one
species strictly dominates the other (Eq. (4) has no
fixed points for 0 < x < 1), as well as cases that pro-
mote coexistence of the species (stable internal fixed
point) or lead to bistability (unstable internal fixed
point) in coordination games [5].
B. Growth
Population growth occurs through transitions
(i,N) → (i + 1, N + 1) and (i,N) → (i,N + 1). In
the former case an individual of type A (mutant)
reproduces, in the latter an individual of type B
(wildtype) generates an offspring. These processes
occur without the removal of any existing member
of the population, such that the overall size of the
population increases. They happen with rates
(i,N)→ (i+ 1, N + 1) : rAi,N = iΓ(N, t),
(i,N)→ (i,N + 1) : rBi,N = (N − i)Γ(N, t),
(5)
respectively. The per-capita growth rate, Γ(N, t), is
assumed to be the same for both species such that
there is no selection in this sector of the model.
We first consider the deterministic behaviour of the
population size. Writing N(t) = 〈N(t)〉, we find
dN
dt
= N Γ(N, t). (6)
Therefore, we can use Γ(N, t) as a mathematical de-
vice to generate specific growth laws for the average
population size. For example, choosing Γ(N, t) =
α (const.) corresponds to exponential growth, or
Γ(N, t) = r(1−N/K) generates logistic growth with
carrying capacity K.
For the rest of the manuscript we study a population
whose size follows a power-law in time,
N(t) = N0t
γ . (7)
This is achieved by setting
Γ(N, t) =
γ
t
, (8)
or likewise
Γ(N, t) = γ
(
N0
N
)1/γ
. (9)
We always assume that the dynamics is started at
time t = 1 with an initial size N(t = 1) = N0, and
that the growth exponent γ ≥ 0. This growth law
captures a variety of behaviours: Choosing γ = 0
corresponds to a scenario with a constant popula-
tion size, N(t) = N0. On the other hand, choosing
γ = 1 results in linear growth over time. In the re-
gion 0 < γ < 1 (sub-linear), the population initially
experiences rapid growth, as is common when pop-
ulation densities are low. As the size increases, the
growth becomes suppressed (although the population
increases indefinitely). Our results below show that
the choice of power-law growth captures non-trivial
behaviour; in particular we find that a single mutant
can be most successful at intermediate choices of the
growth exponent.
Power-law growth has been observed in tumour devel-
opment [3], where surface area [27] or radii [28] grow
linearly in time. Recently, Karev has highlighted the
ubiquity of power-law growth across many scales of
natural processes [29], including the sub-exponential
growth of replicators (nucleotides) [30].
This choice of growth law can also be motivated phys-
ically as follows: Under simple birth–death dynamics
the variance of the number of mutants grows linearly
in time [31]. We can expect that the number of mu-
tants in different realisations of the process will differ
within a range proportional to the standard devia-
tion, growing as t1/2. Imposing additional population
growth, with no advantage to either species, effec-
tively induces a growing boundary for this random-
walk problem. The most interesting scenarios are to
be expected when the growth of the domain (i.e. the
population size) and the typical deviations from the
4mean of mutant numbers follow similar laws. The
boundaries of the domain are then ‘reachable’, so
that fixation and extinction may occur. On the other
hand, intrinsic noise does not dominate when the
population is large so that arrival at either of the
boundaries may not necessarily be certain.
Finally, although the two representations of the per-
capita growth rate [Eqs. (8) and (9)] result in the
same dynamics, their interpretations are different.
The explicit time-dependence of Eq. (8) suggests ex-
ternal moderation of the growth rate, such as control-
ling nutrient supply in an experiment. On the other
hand, the appearance of the total population size in
Eq. (9) suggests some degree of self-moderation, sim-
ilar to logistic or Gompertzian growth.
III. DETERMINISTIC FLOW FOR 2× 2
GAMES IN GROWING POPULATIONS
The full model is stochastic and individual-based. A
mathematical description can be formed in terms of
the master equation which describes the behaviour
of the probability, Pi,N (t), to find the population in
state (i,N) at time t. It is given by
dPi,N
dt
= T+i−1,NPi−1,N − T+i,NPi,N
+ T−i+1,NPi+1,N − T−i,NPi,N
+ rAi−1,N−1Pi−1,N−1 − rAi,NPi,N
+ rBi,N−1Pi,N−1 − rBi,NPi,N . (10)
From this equation we can derive ordinary differen-
tial equations (ODEs) for the time-evolution of the
first moments, i = 〈i(t)〉, N = 〈N(t)〉. This follows
standard steps as described, for example, in [12, 13].
The population size, N , follows Eq. (6). The number
of mutants, i, satisfies
di
dt
=
i(N − i)
N
[g(piA, piB)− g(piB , piA)] + iΓ(N, t).
(11)
We can show the fraction of mutants, x = i/N , fol-
lows the replicator equation (4) by using Eqs. (6),
(11), and the quotient rule of differentiation: x˙ =
i˙/N − xN˙/N .
We can represent the deterministic dynamics in the
(i,j)-plane, where j = N − i is the number of wild-
type individuals. We use Eq. (9) to express Γ in terms
of N = i+ j, and we arrive at closed expressions for
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FIG. 2. Deterministic flow for the dominance game in a
growing population, as given by Eq. (12). Payoff matrix is
given by Eq. (13). Here we consider no growth (top-left),
weak (top-right), intermediate (bottom-left) and linear
(bottom-right) growth. Data shown is for β = 0.1 and
N0 = 100.
the evolution of i and j,
di
dt
=
i j
i+ j
[g(piA, piB)− g(piB , piA)] + γi
(
N0
i+ j
)1/γ
,
dj
dt
=
i j
i+ j
[g(piB , piA)− g(piA, piB)] + γj
(
N0
i+ j
)1/γ
.
(12)
We now consider these dynamics under different evo-
lutionary game scenarios.
In Figs. 2, 3, and 4 we show the deterministic flow
field (12) for dominance, coordination, and coexis-
tence games for different growth exponents. We de-
scribe each figure in turn below. The dark-shaded
regions in these figures correspond to N < N0 (with
N0 = 100); these are situations which cannot be re-
alised as the population starts at size N0 and then
increases. It is, however, illustrative to show the flow
in this region as well. The light-shaded regions indi-
cate the region where growth dominates over selec-
tion, i.e. i˙+ j˙ > |i˙− j˙|. The thick, solid line indicates
the deterministic trajectory of a single mutant in the
wildtype population.
Dominance game: Here the fitness of one species is
strictly higher than that of the other, irrespective of
the composition of the population. A payoff matrix
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FIG. 3. Deterministic flow for the coordination game
in a growing population, as given by Eq. (12). Payoff
matrix is given by Eq. (14) with x? = 0.2. Data shown is
for β = 0.1 and N0 = 100.
which produces this dynamics is
A B
A 5 2
B 3 1
, (13)
for which one finds piA(x) > piB(x) for all x. Hence in
this game (and in the absence of noise) the mutants
will always eventually prevail (j → 0).
The dominance of the mutants in this game is high-
lighted in Fig. 2. There is, however, an initial pe-
riod in which both species grow in number. This is
a consequence of our choice of growth law which has
an initial phase of rapid expansion, such that repro-
duction events dominate over selection in the early
stages. The initial expansion is greatest for large γ,
and the region in which growth dominates also in-
creases with γ. When the population size is large,
the dynamics are very similar to the no-growth case
as selection dominates over growth for large N .
Coordination game: This scenario represents a
case of bistability, and can be conveniently repre-
sented by the payoff matrix
A B
A 1 1− x?
B x? 1
, (14)
where 0 < x? < 1. An individual’s payoff is maximal
if it interacts with another of its own type. If mutant
numbers are low, it is likely that they will have a low
expected payoff and will be selected against. How-
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FIG. 4. Deterministic flow for the coexistence game in a
growing population, as given by Eq. (12). Payoff matrix
is as in Eq. (15) with x? = 0.8. Data shown is for β = 0.1
and N0 = 100.
ever, if their numbers are large then they will have a
higher payoff than the wildtype and will be selected
for. At some intermediate number there will be a ‘tip-
ping point’, where the direction of selection changes
sign. In the deterministic replicator dynamics (4) this
unstable fixed point is located at x?. The boundary
states in which the mutant is extinct (x = 0) or fix-
ated (x = 1) are both stable.
The resulting flow fields for the coordination game
in growing populations is shown in Fig. 3. The two
basins of attraction are separated by the unstable
fixed point line (we use x? = 0.2 in the figure). As
in the dominance game the number of individuals of
both types grow initially. However, when the popula-
tion size is large enough selection dominates over the
growth, and the dynamics resembles the no-growth
scenario. This ultimately leads to the extinction of
one species. Under deterministic dynamics, the ini-
tial condition determines which one of the two species
ultimately prevails; in this case the single mutant is
destined to perish eventually.
Coexistence game: In a coexistence game the pop-
ulation is driven towards a heterogeneous state in
which both species are present. An individual’s pay-
off is maximised if it interacts with the other species.
These games can be conveniently parameterised as
A B
A 1 1 + x?
B 2− x? 1,
(15)
where 0 < x? < 1 is a stable fixed point under repli-
6cator dynamics (4). The boundary states in which
the mutant is extinct (x = 0) or fixated (x = 1) are
both unstable.
The corresponding flow fields are shown in Fig. 4
for different growth exponents and a fixed point of
x? = 0.8. As before both species grow provided their
numbers are sufficiently low. Selection does always
act to maintain a heterogeneous population, however
growth dominates for a large proportion of the (i, j)-
plane (for large γ). Under such deterministic dynam-
ics no species would be lost from the system. This
outcome changes if intrinsic stochasticity is accounted
for, however it becomes increasingly difficult to es-
cape from the stable fixed point as the population
size increases.
IV. STOCHASTIC POPULATION
DYNAMICS
We now turn to the outcome of the stochastic
individual-based model. We focus on the case in
which one single mutant of type A is initially present
in the population of N0− 1 wildtypes. Intrinsic noise
in the birth–death dynamics then implies the possi-
bility that this mutant may go extinct, or take over
the entire population. In populations of constant size
one of these two outcomes will inevitably occur. As
we will see below, this is not always the case when
the population grows. Our analysis focuses on the
fixation probability of the mutant, which we denote
by φ1. To obtain a systematic characterisation we
investigate the different types of games separately.
A. Dominance game
In the dominance game described by the payoff ma-
trix in Eq. (13), selection acts in favour of the mu-
tant. Growth of the population increases the strength
of selection relative to the strength of the intrinsic
noise, reducing the probability that the mutant goes
extinct. This in turn leads to a fixation probability
which increases monotonically with the growth expo-
nent γ. We have verified this in simulations but do
not show the data here, as it is relatively unspectac-
ular.
Considering a mutant whose fitness is consistently
lower than that of the wildtype we find that the prob-
ability of fixation monotonically decreases with the
growth exponent. We do not investigate these trivial
results in more detail.
B. Coordination game
We now turn to the scenario of coordination games,
as defined by the payoff matrix in Eq. (14). The fix-
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FIG. 5. Probability for a single mutant to reach fixa-
tion in coordination games. Symbols are data from 106
simulations of the stochastic model, run until the mu-
tant is extinct or has reached fixation. Lines are guides
to the eye. (a) The location of the fixed point is held
fixed at x? = 0.2, and the selection strength is varied
between curves. (b) The selection strength is fixed at
β = 0.1, and different curves correspond to locations of
the unstable fixed point of the replicator dynamics. For
all simulations the initial size of the population at t = 1
is N0 = 100; the payoff matrix is as in Eq. (14).
ation probability of a single mutant, φ1, in a popula-
tion subject to power-law growth is shown in Fig. 5.
We consider multiple combinations of the growth ex-
ponent γ, the selection strength β, and the location
of the unstable fixed point x?. The data in Fig. 5
shows that growth can have a non-trivial effect on
the success of the mutant, provided that selection is
sufficiently weak and that the fixed point is not too
far from the extinction state. The fixation probability
of the mutant is then highest at intermediate speeds
of growth.
An intuitive understanding of this behaviour can be
obtained as follows: In the initial phases of the dy-
namics the population is small, and the effects of in-
trinsic noise dominate. Different realisations of the
stochastic process will lead to fractions of mutants
spread across the interval 0 < x < 1. Crucially, these
occupy both the region to the left of the unstable in-
ternal fixed point (x < x?), and the region to the
right (x > x?). With time the population grows, and
so the underlying deterministic flow becomes stronger
relative to the intrinsic noise. Trajectories to the left
7of the fixed point will experience an increasing pull
towards extinction of the mutant, whereas those to
the right of x? lead to its fixation.
For small growth exponents γ, the population size
remains close to N0 for a long time. Thus the effects
of selection do not set in in the early stages, and the
mutant number can cross back and forth over the
fixed point until one of the absorbing boundaries is
reached. The fixation probability is essentially that
of a coordination game in a population of constant
and relatively small size.
At moderate γ the population undergoes an initial
phase of relatively free exploration, populating the
basins on both sides of the fixed point. As the pop-
ulation grows the deterministic pull sets in. Reali-
sations that are to the right of the fixed point, and
which could normally have diffused back and led to
extinction of the mutant are prevented from doing
so (statistically) and reach fixation instead (x = 1).
Similarly realisations to the left of x?, which may ul-
timately have crossed the fixed point again and lead
to fixation in the absence of growth, now lead to ex-
tinction of the mutant (x = 0) due to the onset of
deterministic pull. If the fixed point is close to the
extinction state the former effects outweighs the lat-
ter. This results in an increased net probability for
the mutant to reach fixation rather than extinction.
At large values of the growth exponent, the deter-
ministic pull sets in very quickly. The period of ini-
tial (nearly) free drift is short, and the mutants do
not have time to expand and populate the basin to
the right of the fixed point. Broadly speaking the
number of mutants remains small, and they quickly
experience an increasing pull towards extinction. The
chances for the mutant to reach fixation are reduced.
In the extreme case of very quick growth (γ & 1)
the system becomes effectively deterministic immedi-
ately, hence φ1 ≈ 0. This is confirmed in Fig. 5.
We next briefly discuss the effects of the selection
strength, β. As seen in Fig. 5(a), increasing the se-
lection strength moves the maximum in fixation prob-
ability towards lower values of the growth exponent
γ. This appears natural as increased selection indi-
cates stronger deterministic flow at any given size of
the population. If selection is too strong the mutants
are unlikely to overcome the initial barrier of adverse
selection, even for moderate growth exponents. We
then find monotonically decreasing dependence of fix-
ation probability on the growth exponent γ.
The above interpretation also suggests that the lo-
cation of the internal fixed point might be relevant.
As described, the initial increase in fixation probabil-
ity with the growth exponent is due to the gradual
‘trapping’ of realisations by the increasing determin-
istic pull. An increased fixation probability is thus
only to be expected if the basin to the right of x?
is sufficiently large. This is confirmed in Fig. 5(b),
where we demonstrate that the maximum in φ1 as a
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FIG. 6. Breakdown of the one-third law of coordi-
nation games in a growing population. Symbols show
simulation results for the probability of a single mu-
tant to reach fixation. Data is obtained from 106 sim-
ulations of the stochastic model, run until extinction
or fixation of the mutant. Dashed lines are the fixa-
tion probabilities in a population of fixed size N = N0
(x? = 0, 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 4/9 from top to bottom), com-
puted analytically by standard methods [2, 7]. Horizon-
tal dotted line is the fixation probability φ1 = 1/N0 under
neutral selection in a population of constant size N0. In
the inset we vary x? more finely, with values 9/27 (trian-
gles), 10/27 (circles), and 11/27 (squares). For all simu-
lations the initial population at t = 1 is N0 = 100, the
growth exponent is γ = 0.5, and the payoff matrix is given
by Eq. (14).
function of the growth exponent γ is only present if
x? is sufficiently small. If the fixed point is too far
from the initial condition x = 1/N0 only very few
runs are able to cross the barrier before the increas-
ing deterministic pull confines them to the extinction
basin. Thus, when x? is large, we find monotonically
decreasing fixation probability as growth increases.
This interplay between φ1 and x
? is reminiscent of
the so-called ‘one-third law’ in evolutionary game the-
ory, which is valid for populations of fixed finite size
N interacting in a coordination game. The fixation
probability of a single invading mutant in the limit
of weak, but non-zero selection is then higher than
that under neutral selection (φ = 1/N), if x? < 1/3
[32, 33]. We next investigate the impact of growth on
this rule.
First, it is useful to re-formulate the one-third law for
coordination games in a constant-size population in
the following way: At small selection strengths β, the
fixation probability φ1 is an increasing function of β
if x? < 1/3, and it is a decreasing function otherwise.
Given that φ1 → 0 in the limit β → ∞ for coordi-
nation games, we expect a maximum in the function
φ = φ(β) when x? < 1/3, and a monotonically de-
creasing function if x? > 1/3. This is verified by
the dashed lines in Fig. 6, which show the analytical
solution for the fixation probability in a population
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FIG. 7. Stochastic dynamics of a single mutant in the
coexistence game. Solid lines show the probability to have
reached either extinction or fixation by time t (left axis;
γ = 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 from top to bottom). Symbols
show the root-mean-square of the distance from the stable
fixed point x? (right axis; see text for details). Data is
from 104 simulations of the stochastic model, run until a
maximum time t = 20, 000. For all simulations the initial
size of the population at t = 1 is N0 = 100, selection
strength is β = 0.1, the stable fixed point is located at
x? = 0.8, and the payoff matrix is as in Eq. (15).
of fixed size N = 100. This solution is obtained by
standard methods [2, 7]. For x? = 1/3, the fixation
probability is equal to the neutral result until β is
sufficiently large.
Simulations of a growing population reveal that the
one-third law can break down when the size of the
population is not fixed. The symbols in Fig. 6 are
simulation data for φ1 in a population with growth
exponent γ = 0.5. In the limit of weak-selection (β →
0) we find φ1 → 1/N0, which is the result one obtains
for neutral selection in a fixed-size population. The
fixation probability of the mutant can increase with
β, even when x? ≥ 1/3. This is highlighted in the
inset of Fig. 6, where we vary x? more finely.
C. Coexistence game
We now turn to the case of coexistence games in pop-
ulations subject to power-law growth. In this situa-
tion the deterministic replicator dynamics (4) has a
stable internal fixed point, indicating species coexis-
tence. However, in finite populations of constant size
an invading mutant will either go extinct or reach
fixation due to the intrinsic stochasticity. As in the
case of the coordination game, the probability and
mean time it takes to reach fixation or extinction in
a constant-size population can be computed analyti-
cally from the backward master equation [2, 7].
We find that the situation changes when the popu-
lation is allowed to grow. With time the determin-
istic pull towards the internal stable state becomes
stronger relative to random drift, and as a conse-
quence fast-growing populations may never reach ab-
sorption. This can be seen in Fig. 1.
The simulation data shown as solid lines in Fig. 7
demonstrate this. The lines indicate the fraction of
simulation runs in which a single mutant has either
reached fixation or gone extinct by time t, i.e. the
cumulative distribution of absorption times (CDF).
This quantity reaches the value of one for γ = 0 (con-
stant population size), indicating that all runs reach
either x = 0 (extinction of the mutant) or x = 1 (fix-
ation) eventually. The same is found for small, but
positive values of the growth exponent γ – all sam-
ples reach an absorbing state eventually. For faster-
growing populations we find a finite fraction of sam-
ples in which the mutant neither reaches fixation nor
goes extinct. Our simulations naturally need to be
stopped at some finite time, but as seen from the
data in Fig. 7 the cumulative distribution of absorp-
tion times reaches a constant value (less than one)
at finite times, with no further increase observed in
the later parts of the simulations. This confirms that
the time horizon of our simulations is sufficiently long,
and we can reasonably assume that no further extinc-
tion or fixation events would occur if the simulations
were continued to later times.
To explain why coexistence can prevail indefinitely
in growing populations, we focus on the root-mean-
square distance from the stable fixed point x?. For
each simulation run we record the fraction of mu-
tants, x(t) = i(t)/N(t) as a function of time, and
then compute
RMS(t) =
√〈[
x(t)− x?]2〉
a
, (16)
where 〈·〉a represents the average over ‘active’ sim-
ulation runs, i.e. runs that have not reached fixa-
tion or extinction before time t. This quantity is a
measure of how close, on average, the fraction of mu-
tants is to the deterministic value x?. It is plotted
as symbols in Fig. 7. As can be seen, the RMS dis-
tance generally decreases with time; the population
size is increasing such that the impact of intrinsic
fluctuations decreases and deterministic effects dom-
inate. This confines the mutant fraction to the region
around x?. The escape probability is related to the
width of the distribution (of i/N) about x?. As this
width decreases, so does the probability of escape.
The effect is stronger for faster-growing populations.
In the stacked area chart 8 we illustrate the outcome
of introducing a single mutant into a wildtype pop-
ulation for different choices of the growth exponents
γ. For each realisation there are three possible out-
comes: the initial mutant goes extinct, reaches fixa-
tion, or coexists with the wildtype until the end of the
simulation (by extrapolation we then assume coexis-
tence will continue indefinitely). The figure reveals
several characteristic features: the probability for the
mutant to go extinct monotonically decreases as the
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FIG. 8. Stacked area chart for the probability of the
different outcomes of a single mutant in the coexistence
game. The mutant may either reach fixation, go extinct,
or the two species coexist until the end of the simulation.
Data is from 104 simulations run until a maximum time
of t = 20, 000. The initial population at t = 1 is N0 =
100, selection strength is β = 0.1, the stable fixed point
is located at x? = 0.8, and the payoff matrix is as in
Eq. (15). The vertical axis has been truncated.
growth exponent γ is increased. This is intuitively
easy to understand, quicker growth implies that the
deterministic pull of the coexistence game becomes
relevant already in the initial stages of the simula-
tion. This drives the system towards the coexistence
point, and away from extinction. This also leads to
an increased probability for the mutant to reach fix-
ation at intermediate growth exponents, see Fig. 8.
The system is driven to the coexistence point, but
growth is not quick enough to eliminate the effects of
random drift immediately. Mutant numbers fluctu-
ate around the coexistence point, and the population
can then be driven to fixation at x = 1 by intrinsic
noise.
When γ sufficiently large (fast growth), the latter
step is inhibited. The fraction of mutants will set-
tle around x? as described above, and the mutant
type will be unable to overcome the selection barrier
to reach fixation. An increasing fraction of realisa-
tions is found to remain near the coexistence point
indefinitely, and neither fixation nor extinction of the
invading mutant takes place.
Taken altogether these effects result in the behaviour
of the fixation probability shown in Fig. 9. Strong
selection helps the mutant avoid extinction, but com-
bined with fast growth the deterministic pull to-
wards x? cannot be overcome and fixation cannot be
reached. With some growth the mutant has a higher
chance of escaping extinction, and these combined ef-
fects lead to a maximum in the fixation probability
φ1. Provided the fixed point x
? is sufficiently close
to the boundary at x = 1 we find maximal fixation
probability at intermediate growth rates γ. This ef-
fect is stronger when the fixed point is close to x = 1,
���
����
���
���
����
���
ϕ � (�) β��-�����-���
��-���
��-���
�����
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
����
���
���
����
���
ϕ � (�) �*������
���
���
���
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� �������
����
����
����
����
����
������ ��������� γ
FIG. 9. Probability for a single mutant to reach fixation
in coexistence games. Symbols are data from 104 simula-
tions of the stochastic model, run until time t = 20, 000.
Lines are guides to the eye. (a) The location of fixed
point is held fixed at x? = 0.8, and the selection strength
is varied between curves. (b) The selection strength is
fixed at β = 0.1, and different curves correspond to lo-
cations of the stable fixed point. The initial size of the
population at t = 1 is N0 = 100; the payoff matrix is as
in Eq. (15).
and can be absent if the barrier between the coexis-
tence point and fixation is too large (i.e. when x? is
too far to the left).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have investigated the effects of pop-
ulation growth on the outcome of stochastic evolu-
tionary games. While the stochastic dynamics of
2×2 evolutionary games in constant-size populations
is largely understood, we find new features in grow-
ing populations. To systematically study these ef-
fects we have disentangled growth and selection, and
assume that both species in the population grow at
the same (per capita) rate. We impose an external
time-dependence on these rates; while this can be in-
terpreted as an experimental protocol in which the
availability of nutrients is varied in time, our main ob-
jective is to generate specific growth laws of the pop-
ulation. We focus on the case of power-law growth,
N(t) = N0t
γ , and control the growth exponent γ.
The most interesting behaviour arises in coordination
10
and coexistence games; we study scenarios in which
a single mutant tries to invade a wildtype popula-
tion. We find that intermediate growth rates can lead
to the maximum chance of success of the mutant; if
growth is too fast or too slow (or non-existent), the
ability for the mutant to invade is compromised. This
effect is present in both classes of games; the origin
of this effect is different in the two cases, though.
In coordination games, the mutant will either be-
come extinct or reach fixation eventually. Popula-
tion growth increases the effect of selection over time
relative to intrinsic noise. In the later stages of the
process this prevents the mutant number from cross-
ing the barrier separating the basins of attraction of
extinction and fixation, and shifts the balance be-
tween the two outcomes. These effects also lead to
the breakdown of the one-third law of coordination
games.
In coexistence games, a growing population can pro-
mote indefinite coexistence of the mutant and wild-
type individuals. By effectively decreasing the magni-
tude of intrinsic fluctuations, population growth con-
fines the fraction of mutants to the region near the
deterministic coexistence point. If the growth rate is
moderate, selection is strong enough initially to pre-
vent extinction but leaves the population size small
enough to be able to eventually escape from coexis-
tence to fixation of the mutant.
In the appendix we propose an approximation of the
dynamics in terms of a single stochastic differential
equation. Here the amplitude of multiplicative noise
decreases gradually in time, representing the increas-
ing population size. This equation is formulated ad-
hoc and we make no claims of analytical rigour. How-
ever, we find good quantitative agreement with direct
simulations. This framework allows efficient compu-
tation when population sizes are large, and may lead
to further analytical progress.
Introducing a variable population size has revealed in-
teresting effects in many evolutionary models [16, 20,
23]. We have continued this line of work and system-
atically investigated the fate of mutants in a growing
population. In biological settings populations grow –
this is often their primary function. Adding growth
to well-established evolutionary models thus helps to
bridge the gap between experimental work on grow-
ing and evolving populations, and theoretical under-
standing. One next step might be developing mod-
els in which the growth-law emerges dynamically, for
example through environmental processes acting on
the population. If such an emergent law matches our
externally-imposed growth dynamics, then we expect
our results to hold, at least qualitatively.
On a general level, our work contributes to the in-
creasing literature that tries to understand the in-
terplay between deterministic selection and intrinsic
stochasticity. Varying the intensity of noise by intro-
ducing population growth is a novel way to approach
this task.
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Appendix: Approximation by stochastic
differential equation
The dynamics of large but finite populations can of-
ten be described by stochastic differential equations
(SDE). These resulting SDEs can formally be de-
rived using a Kramers–Moyal or system-size expan-
sion, and a well-defined formalism is available to do
this [12, 13]. For non-constant populations this SDE
approach has been used, for example, in [16–18, 20].
Such a procedure can have numerous benefits: the
approximation of an individual-based process by an
SDE can lead to significant computational speed-ups
[34], which is especially important in our scenario
where the growing population can quickly reach very
large numbers.
In our model there are two degrees of freedom, which
we write as x(t) = i(t)/N(t) and N(t). Our aim here
is not to rigorously derive SDEs for x and N (such a
derivation is beyond the scope of this article), but to
test the viability of a simpler phenomenological ap-
proach which has a significantly lower computational
cost. Specifically, we simulate the process
x˙ = x(1− x) [g(piA, piB)− g(piB , piA)]
+
√
x(1− x) [g(piA, piB) + g(piB , piA)]
N(t)
η(t),
(A.1)
where N(t) = N0t
γ is the deterministic system size,
and where η(t) is Gaussian white noise of unit ampli-
tude. This equation is motivated by the well-known
outcome for the diffusion approximation in popula-
tions of constant size N , as derived for example in
[35]. Ignoring the noise term, we recover the replica-
tor equation (4).
In Fig. 10 we show data from a simple numerical
integration of Eq. (A.1) (Euler–Maruyama scheme
with constant timestep). In our approach we termi-
nate simulations once the variable x leaves the in-
terval (0, 1), and identify these realisations as fix-
ated (x ≥ 1) or extinct (x ≤ 0). Despite the ad-
hoc nature of Eq. (A.1), the data in Fig. 10 demon-
strates that this approach is sufficient to capture the
main features: Simulations of the coordination game
[Fig. 10(a); to be compared with Fig. 5(a)] and the
coexistence game [Fig. 10(b); to be compared with
Fig. 8] show good agreement with individual-based
simulations, even at the quantitative level. We at-
tribute small quantitative deviations to the approx-
imations made in formulating the SDE, to the dis-
cretisation used in integrating it, and to artifacts in
the numerical treatment of the multiplicative noise
and absorbing boundaries.
The natural next step would be to attempt to ana-
lytically determine the fixation probabilities directly
from the SDE (A.1). While standard techniques are
available for autonomous SDEs (i.e., those without
external time dependence) [12, 36], the problem is
more intricate in our case due to the explicit time-
dependence of the noise amplitude. While a back-
ward Fokker–Planck equation can still be formulated
(and solved numerically), an analytical characterisa-
tion of fixation times remains an open challenge.
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FIG. 10. Results from numerical integration of the SDE (A.1). Simulations are started at x = 0.01 at time t = 1 to
represent the case in which a single mutant is placed in a population of initial size N0 = 100. (a) Probability for the
mutant to fixate in coordination games. This is the analog of Fig. 5(a). (b) Probabilities of the different outcomes at
the end of a simulation in coexistence games. This is the analog of Fig. 8. Timestep of the numerical integration is
∆t = 0.001. Dotted lines are analogous results from the individual-based model.
